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ABSTRACT
Commercial load balancers are often in use, and the production network at Arizona
State University (ASU) is no exception. However, because the load balancer uses IP
addresses, the solution does not apply to all applications. One such application is
Rsyslog. This software processes syslog packets and stores them in files. The loss rate
of incoming log packets is high due to the incoming rate of the data. The Rsyslog
servers are overwhelmed by the continuous data stream. To solve this problem a
software defined networking (SDN) based load balancer is designed to perform a
transport-level load balancing over the incoming load to Rsyslog servers. In this
solution the load is forwarded to one Rsyslog server at a time, according to one of
a Round-Robin, Random, or Load-Based policy. This gives time to other servers to
process the data they have received and prevent them from being overwhelmed. The
evaluation of the proposed solution is conducted a physical testbed with the same
data feed as the commercial solution. The results suggest that the SDN-based load
balancer is competitive with the commercial load balancer. Replacing the software
OpenFlow switch with a hardware switch is likely to further improve the results.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
With the rapid growth of web applications in the late 1990’s, load balancing was
used to divide the network load among identical web servers in order to minimize
the service time to users and maximize the performance of servers. At that time,
techniques such as those based on DNS and adaptive TTL were exploited by enterprise
administrators [8].
Today, commercial load balancers are often in use, including in the production
network at Arizona State University (ASU). But sometimes there are applications
that are not well suited to how the commercial products balance the load. One such
application is Rsyslog. This application is in charge of processing syslog packets and
writing them into files. It receives its input from Palo Alto firewalls. This firewall
generates a wide variety of log messages to alert the network administrator of an
existing issue in or a threat to the entire campus network. As can be imagined the
amount and the speed of data that this application generates is huge. The current
load balancing solution at ASU is used to spread the load among several Rsyslog
servers. The problem is that the existing load balancer does not divide the load
equally among the servers because it uses the source IP address to divide the load.
Also, it cannot forward the load to one Rsyslog server at a time because there are
multiple Palo Alto firewalls and each one of them is mapped to an Rsyslog server.
This leads to having unequal sized files stored on the servers as well as the Rsyslog
servers being overwhelmed with the amount of input and losing data. To address
1
this problem, we propose to spread the load among servers using a solution based on
software defined networking (SDN).
1.2 Contributions
We propose a solution to load balance the data coming from a Palo Alto firewall
among servers using software defined networking. This is accomplished by placing an
OpenFlow switch in front of the incoming data. The OpenFlow switch, controlled
by a controller that we have developed, gives us the ability to forward these packets
to our desired server. This solution enables us to make changes to forwarding as
circumstances in the network change.
We develop three different load balancing policies: Round-Robin, Random and
Load-Based. The first two policies work without measuring forwarded load to each
server. However, in the Load-Based policy our goal is to be aware of the amount of
forwarded load to each server in order to spread the load as equally as possible. We
use a software switch to run our experiments in a testbed using a real data feed from
a Palo Alto firewall.
We evaluate each load-balancing policy, both with and without server failures, for
a period of five days. We compare the results with syslog data stored on files at our
servers to that generated by ASU’s current commercial load-balancing solution. Given
that the Palo Alto feed uses UDP, which may result in packet losses, we find that
our solution, regardless of the policy in use and regardless of having server failures or
not, is able to deliver the data at a rate (computed by dividing number of syslog logs
stored on the testbed to the number of syslog logs stored on ASU’s Rsyslog servers)
with the commercial solution. As the results of experiments show, the data delivery
rate is in the range of 0.9923 to 1.0446 with the mean of 1.0109 and the standard
deviation of 0.0197. (A rate of over 1 is possible because, while the feeds from the
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Palo Alto are the same, the path internal to ASU’s network is different and losses
occur from the use of UDP.)
To evaluate which load-balancing policy spreads the load more equally among the
servers, we define a split ratio as the ratio of the smallest sized file by the largest
sized file received on our servers. The closer the split ratio is to one, the better the
load-balancing policy divides the load. In the first experiment, without having server
failures, the average split ratios over five days period for the Round-Robin, Random
and Load-Based policies are 0.9906, 0.9695 and 0.9809, respectively. In the second
experiment, where servers may fail, the average split ratios for the Round-Robin,
Random and Load-Based policies are 0.8298, 0.8791 and 0.9796, respectively.
Our results show that Round-Robin policy divides the load slightly better than the
other two policies when there is no server failures. However, in the second experiment,
where server failures exist, the results show us that the Load-Based policy is the best
choice by far. Overall the Load-Based policy has the best split ratio average over the
two experiments.
We conclude our software defined networking load-balancing solution is competi-
tive with the existing commercial solutions. Our results likely would improve further
if a hardware OpenFlow switch was used in the testbed.
3
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Background on SDN
2.1.1 What is SDN?
In conventional switches and routers forwarding decisions happen based on MAC
and IP address, respectively. Both the control and forwarding planes are on the same
node in this hardware. What SDN proposes is to decouple these two planes from one
another and use a centralized controller [21]. Since all nodes forming the forwarding
plane are connected to the controller, the controller has a view of whole network. This
makes the controller the best candidate for making forwarding decisions. In addition,
the forwarding decision may be based on more fields of the header, even on non-IP
based protocols.
2.1.2 Why SDN?
SDN has the potential to simplify network management, and enable innovation
in and evolution of computer networks [21]. It is based on the principle of separating
the control and data planes. The OpenFlow specification describes the information
exchange between the two planes [22]. In this architecture, an OpenFlow switch
contains a flow table consisting of flow entries. A flow entry is made up of fields on
which incoming packets are matched, and actions to be applied upon a match. If there
is no match, the packet is forwarded to a controller, which runs a program to handle
the packet, and decide whether to insert, delete, or update flow entries in the flow
table for subsequent packets matching the same fields. As well, statistics are collected
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on packets; this information may be used by the controller to make decisions. This
allows us to build innovative applications which match with our needs, and update
them as circumstances change. One such application is load balancing.
2.2 Using SDN in Load Balancing Applications
2.2.1 OpenFlow Based Load Balancing
Similar to our proposed work, Upaal and Brandon [27] investigate whether an
OpenFlow based load balancer can compete with existing highly specialized commer-
cial load balancers. Three basic OpenFlow algorithms are implemented and bench-
marked. The policies implemented are random, round robin, and load-based load
balancing. The random policy sends a request to a random server. The round robin
policy uses a circular queue to decide where to send a request. The load-based policy
sends a request to the server with the lowest load, where load is defined as the number
of pending requests.
The results indicate that as the processing time per packet at the server is in-
creased, the load-based policy performs the best. When the processing time is 10ms
the utilization of the servers is low, so all of the algorithms are essentially the same.
Once the time to service of each request increases from 10ms to 20ms, utilization in-
creases. The higher the processing time becomes, the more critical the load balancing
algorithm.
In another experiment, two different rules are installed on the OpenFlow switches,
one that simply forwards the arriving packets, and another that modifies the packet
headers. For the first rule, the performance is as good as an ordinary switch but for
the second rule it decreases by two orders of magnitude. The reason is attributed to
packets in the buffer being dropped while they are waiting for the OpenFlow switch
5
to rewrite the packet header. This indicates that preventing bottlenecks in OpenFlow
switches is important in order to have a load balancer with a reasonable speed com-
pared with commercial ones. It is expected that in the next generation of OpenFlow
switches (or even firmware updates) rule-rewriting will have high performance.
2.2.2 OpenFlow-Based Server Load Balancing Gone Wild
Load balancing in enterprise networks is one potential application of OpenFlow.
As Wang et al. discuss, they use a binary tree to represent the space of all possible IP
addresses [28]. The ith level in the binary tree corresponds to the ith most significant
bits of the IP address. The nodes in a subtree correspond to a prefix match on the
path from the root to that subtree. Under the assumption that each IP address
supplies equal load on the network, a tree representation is effective since at each
level the load is distributed equally between the two subtrees. This solution allows
fine granularity of load distribution.
(a) Three resource instances, R1, R2, R3 cover
the IP space.
(b) Desirable load balancing configuration with
a minimum number of wild card matches.
Figure 2.1: Load Balancing Based on a Binary Tree [28].
Given that ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) is an expensive resource
in routers, minimizing TCAM is a useful objective. As Figure 2.1a shows, subtrees
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00∗, and 010∗ are assigned to resource R1. The representation in Figure 2.1a is not
optimal as it requires six rows in TCAM. There is an equivalent representation that
uses less TCAM space as Figure 2.1b shows. Wang et al. provide an algorithm to
reduce the tree in Figure 2.1a to the one in Figure 2.1b [28]. In their reduction, they
ensure that the connections that are already in place do not get interrupted by the
migration. This is guaranteed by making the active connections migrate after they
are closed. One weakness of this work is the assumption that load is distributed
equally among subtrees. However, the idea of migration is a useful adaptive scheme.
The number of needed wild card matches was reduced by redistributing the IP
space among servers. This solution cannot be used in our proposed work because they
are trying to slice the IP space among servers while we try to spread the incoming
data as equally as possible.
2.2.3 Aster*x: Load-Balancing as a Network Primitive
In Plug’n Serve (the precursor to Aster*x), load balancing is studied in an unstruc-
tured network [20]. Their interest is in networks that are not built for the purpose of
developing server farms such as campus networks and enterprise networks, because
background traffic and biased network topologies could affect the performance of
network-agnostic load-balancing significantly [20]. The question addressed is whether
adding more servers to an unstructured network can improve the overall performance
and whether it is possible to devise a general load balancing solution for these types
of networks. One aspect to their system design is that all servers have the same IP
alias. The controller decides to which server to direct the request. Once the controller
chooses a server, it sets up a flow to that server, and the packets are sent at line rate
over that flow path.
Aster*x advances Plug’n Serve by performing load balancing on a larger scale net-
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work, in particular, over a wide area network (WAN) [18]. In addition, the load bal-
ancer can handle the client diversity, serving both local and remote requests. Aster*x
has used the Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) infrastructure to
evaluate its proposed solution [16].
As in Plug’n Serve, in Aster*x all servers use the same IP alias. The controller is
in charge of assigning a server to an incoming request. Three different modules are
used to make the assignment. Two of them probe network congestion and host load
in order to choose the best path, where “best” is the one with the minimum traffic,
to the host with the lowest load. The controller then manages the load and routes
the flows using the algorithm selected.
The idea of probing the network to understand the load is an important idea.
However, our network is not unstructured; as a result there is no significant effect of
substantial background load or biased network topologies over the network-agnostic
load balancing. We can benefit from their idea of using one alias IP address to refer
to a server pool and to put an OpenFlow controller in front of the server pool to act
as a proxy and select which server has to receive the load.
2.2.4 Towards an Elastic Distributed SDN Controller
Scalability and reliability are issues that a centralized controller in an SDN enabled
network suffers. Having distributed controllers instead of one centralized controller
is a solution to these issues. However, a distributed control plane can bring the
problem of having the load divided among controllers unevenly. Dixit et al. proposed
ElastiCon, an Elastic Distributed Controller, to address this problem [13]. They
believe static mapping between a controller and a switch is the main issue [13]. Hence,
in their elastic architecture, the controller pool is dynamically grown or shrunk based
on the network load and the load could be transferred to another controller with a
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reasonable amount of resources when required.
Although migrating switches across controllers is a primitive in their design, it is
not sufficient. Additional mechanisms are provided to support three main operations
to balance the load across the controllers. First, there is a mechanism in charge
of balancing the load among controllers by reassigning switches to controllers with
sufficient resources periodically. Secondly, there is an upper margin which indicates
the total load that could be handled by the resource pool; if the load exceeds this
margin the resource pool has to be grown. Finally, there is a lower margin which
detects when we need to shrink the resource pool.
Although the idea of balancing the load among controllers by measuring their
utilization level is a very good way to make switching and or routing decisions faster,
it is out of the scope of our work.
2.3 Testbed
In this section we introduce some of the software and tools that we use in our
research.
2.3.1 XenServer
XenServer is a free product from Citrix that is used for server virtualization [11].
This open-source virtualization platform has been used in cloud services as well as
server and desktop virtualization. In our project XenServer helps us to install and
manage all the needed virtual machines (VMs) on the physical machine. It is respon-
sible to allocate resources to the VMs.
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2.3.2 Mininet
Mininet is an open-source network emulator tool [19] [2]. Using this tool we
can imitate any arbitrary network topology with all of its components. It provides
end-hosts, switches, links and routers on a single Linux kernel. Using lightweight
virtualization it makes a single system look like a complex network. We can run any
software that is compatible with Linux, from web servers to Wireshark on its end-
hosts. Mininet also gives us the ability to customize our packet forwarding using the
OpenFlow protocol. It has the ability to establish a connection between the emulated
network to a local or remote OpenFlow controller to obtain the packet forwarding
decisions. In this research this useful tool helps us to test the controller before running
it on the testbed.
2.3.3 Open vSwitch
Open vSwitch (OVS) is a distributed software switch [3]. While this software
supports standard management interfaces and networking protocols, its main goal
is to provide switching for hardware virtualizing platforms in a multilayer virtual
switch. This software allows network automation via its programmatic extensions. It
had been used by XenServer and Xen Cloud Platform as their default switch [3]. In
this research we use this software as our OpenFlow enabled switch.
2.4 Controllers
There are several popular OpenFlow controllers written in different languages
offering a wide variety of services. Some of these controllers include:
POX: POX is a good choice for rapid development and for developers who want to
prototype a network controller software. This controller is written in Python.
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Its high-level SDN API allows developers to quickly turn their ideas into reality
and helps them to write their own OpenFlow controller.
OpenMUL: OpenMUL is an SDN/OpenFlow controller whose core is written in C
[12]. Its main goal is to reach a high performance and reliability by virtue of its
multi-threaded core. It has a graphical user interface (GUI) and a web service
API that is bound to representational state transfer architectural limitations
(RESTful API) [14] alongside the command line interface (CLI) that makes the
process of its management much easier. The RESTful web services are used
to return JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and XML format in response to
application-specific web URLs. JSON is a lightweight human-readable open
standard format for data transmission. It was first used as an alternative to
XML to send data between a server and a web application. This controller
supports a variety of SDN south-bound protocols such as OpenFlow 1.0, 1.3
and 1.4 as well as ovsdb and of-config.
Floodlight: Floodlight, an Apache-licensed OpenFlow controller, is a Java-based
controller that can be used for controller development in enterprise networks [1].
This controller is a derivative of another Java-based controller named Beacon
[1]. Floodlight has been used in a commercial product from Big Switch Networks
as core of their network controller software [7].
FlowVisor: FlowVisor, a special purpose OpenFlow controller, is designed to sup-
port network virtualization [24]. FlowVisor has the ability to make slices of
network resources and assign each one of them to a different controller. Net-
work resources can be sliced at any layer, e.g., they could be sliced at layer
one in terms of any combination of switch ports, or they could be split at layer
two in terms of source/destination ethernet address or type; they also could
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be distinguished in terms of source/destination IP address in layer three or as
source/destination UDP/TCP ports in layer four.
OpenDaylight: Big companies such as Cisco, Microsoft, Citrix, Juniper, Intel and
IBM contributed to develop the OpenDaylight SDN/OpenFlow controller [26].
In this project these industry leaders come together with one goal, and that is
to provide a common SDN platform to let other businesses and companies use
it as their base SDN solution. Based on each company’s needs, developers can
utilize the code or even develop new features that can fit into their requirements.
2.5 Splunk and Syslog
Splunk is software that is designed to let its users search, monitor and analyze
machine-generated big data through its web interface [6]. Machine-generated data
includes all data logs that are produced by applications, servers, network devices,
firewalls, etc. One of these log data can be syslog [15] data coming from network
devices such as routers and switches. This syslog data can record the network’s status
including device failures, security threats, performance, and the state of network
connections. Syslog has being used as a common computer message logging standard
for years. Rsyslog is software that is used to store syslog messages on a server. At
the University Technology Office (UTO) of Arizona State University (ASU) Splunk
is being used to capture the log data coming from the Palo Alto (PA) firewalls into
a web-style format that allows network administrators to monitor and analyze these
logs more easily.
Filtering is one of the features that Splunk provides for its users. It allows users
to prevent some of the logs from being indexed in Splunk database. For instance, a
user can define a rule to filter all the logs that are initiated at a specific machine by
its IP address.
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2.6 Current Solution
UTO uses Citrix NetScaler [9] as their current load balancing solution in front of
Rsyslog servers. NetScaler divides the IP address space and spreads the load among
servers based on source IP address of incoming packets. As a result, NetScaler divides
the whole load coming from one PA firewall to one Rsyslog server. Therefore only one
of the Rsyslog servers receives the whole load and the rest of them receive nothing.
With multiple PA firewalls this leads to a very uneven load distribution among Rsyslog
servers.
In the next chapter, we discuss the testbed setup, and our controller design to
balance on load differently, rather than on the IP address space.
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Chapter 3
ARCHITECTURE OF OUR SDN LOAD-BALANCING SOLUTION
In this chapter we discuss the architecture of our OpenFlow based load balancing
controller design and how we use it to improve the current solution for processing the
data coming from Palo Alto (PA) firewalls.
The main concern with our proposed architecture is whether it is fast enough to
keep up with the data rate. We describe the configuration of the testbed, and how we
verify its connections. We conduct experiments in the physical testbed, gather data,
and analyze our results in Chapter 4.
3.1 The Testbed
3.1.1 Topology and Technical Specification
We are given a wire tap to the data that one of the PA firewalls is sending out.
This wire tap is directed at our testbed to feed the load balancer for examination and
verification purposes. (Permission to obtain this tap was granted by the Research
Administration Office of the Arizona Board of Regents for and on behalf of ASU.)
Our testbed includes a physical Dell server with 32 GB of RAM and 32 Intel Xeon
E5-2640 v2 processors, each one working at the speed of 2.00 GHz. On the Dell server
we installed Citrix XenServer version 6.2. Then we installed four virtual machines
(VMs) on the XenServer. We allocated 4 GB of RAM to the first VM and 8 GB of
RAM to each of the other three. Each VM is allocated 4 Xeon CPUs.
In an OpenFlow network there is a central controller that is responsible for making
routing and switching decisions. The first VM is configured to act as our controller
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and the other three are set up as Rsyslog servers. As Figure 3.1 shows, the Open
vSwitch (OVS) is installed on the XenServer. Our software switch is connected to the
controller and the three other VMs. The OVS is configured to have the OpenFlow
protocol enabled on its bridge xenbr0. As a result it sends every new flow to the
controller and then the controller decides whether to install a rule on OVS for similar
flows or handle them on a packet by packet basis.
3.1.2 The Data Feed and its Features
The data coming in to the testbed is the data sent out by the PA firewall. The
data is in syslog format. The existing PA firewall at ASU uses the UDP protocol to
send out its syslog messages. While more recent PA firewalls give the option to send
these syslog messages in TCP packets, we restrict our attention here to UDP.
Recall that the UDP protocol is not a reliable transport protocol. As a result, the
syslog messages might get lost and there is no mechanism to retransmit those packets.
We cannot guarantee there are no packet losses. However our objective is to deliver
as many packets as the current solution delivers to the destination. In Chapter 4 we
design an experiment to perform this validation.
Rsyslog messages are smaller than the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of IPv4
packets. As a result these packets do not get fragmented. Hence, in our design there
is no need to take fragmentation into consideration.
3.1.3 Setting Up the Testbed
Since we use OVS to imitate the behavior of an OpenFlow switch, we must have
OVS running on the XenServer. In our case there are four different network interfaces
on the physical machine. eth0, . . ., eth3. The XenServer has the ability to manage
them through the OVS. In order to do so, when XenServer is booting up it creates four
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Figure 3.1: The Testbed Topology.
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different bridges xenbr0, . . ., xenbr3, using OVS and creates a one-to-one mapping
between each interface and bridge, i.e., eth0 is added to xenbr0 as a port.
When we want to change any IP settings on a physical interface, we have to make
the changes on its mapped bridge interface. From now on, whenever we refer to
configuring physical interfaces such as eth0 and eth1, we are referring to configuring
their mapped bridges. We use all of these bridges to set up our network. Recall
Xenserver is only accessible over the network through its eth0 and eth1 interfaces.
Since the PA is on the local campus network, our testbed must be connected to
that network to obtain the data coming from the PA. The PA forwards its packets to
an IP address in the range of the network addresses we assigned to our testbed. In
our case the network address that the testbed is using is 10.106.19.0/24 and the PA
forwards its data to the IP address of 10.106.19.7. We have set up eth0 to use an IP
address of 10.106.19.6. In this case eth0 is a hop in the data path from the PA to the
Rsyslog server. We call this network, 10.106.19.0/24, our data network.
We also need to have access to the XenServer through another interface to reach
the XenServer remotely to set up the VMs, configure their attributes, and control
them. We call this network our control network. There are three reasons we cannot
use our data network to connect remotely to the XenServer for control purposes:
1. OVS is using our controller to make its forwarding decisions on xenbr0.
2. eth0 is on xenbr0.
3. Our controller only forwards those packets that are targeting to reach to the
Rsyslog server.
As a result any control or management packets on xenbr0 destined to go back to the
computer that is remotely connected to the Xenserver, are dropped by the OVS.
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It is ideal having the management network and the data network to use two
different network addresses, as well as gateways, to prevent any conflict between
them. When we make any changes on one of the networks it does not affect the other
one, since they are completely separated. In our situation due to some restrictions
from the University Technology Office, we use the same network address for both
networks. We assign the eth1 interface an IP address of 10.106.19.4. Recall that
this interface is on xenbr1 which is not controlled by our controller and is a non-
OpenFlow bridge. Hence there should not be any problem with connecting to this
interface remotely.
Since eth0 and eth1 are both on the same network we have to make sure when we
are remotely connected to eth1 all of our management packets are going through this
interface. In order to test connectivity, we unplug the cable connected to eth0. Now
when we want to SSH to 10.106.19.4 from a remote machine we get an error indicating
the server does not exist. The problem is that in our case we have set up eth0 first
and then eth1. This leads to having two different routes to the same destination in
the routing table on the XenServer. The routing table is shown in Figure 3.2. In
this case when management packets want to reach to the remote machine they match
the first match in the routing table which is eth0. To solve this problem we need to
reverse the interface configuration order. We can also solve this issue by disabling
and re-enabling the eth0. This changes the order of entries in the routing table and
leads to matching the correct entry while we are trying to reach to the XenServer
remotely.
Now that we have set up our data and management network we should set up our
Rsyslog servers. We install Rsyslog on the VMs and start this software running so we
can process syslog messages coming from the PA. We install Rsyslog on VM2, VM3
and VM4. We have to set up these VMs in such a way they can interact using our
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Figure 3.2: Erroneous Routing Table on Xenserver
controller. We assign an arbitrary IP address in range of 10.106.19.0/24 to each VM.
Then on the XenServer we add their interfaces to xenbr0 on OVS.
To finish configuring our OpenFlow enabled network, we need to configure xenbr0
on the OVS to connect it to the controller. Our controller is running on VM1. In
OpenFlow, the controller has to communicate with a switch on a non-OpenFlow
network. In order to accomplish that we configure the VM1 networking interface to
have a different network address than the data network. We assigned 192.168.1.10 to
the VM1 interface. We need to configure the XenServer to communicate with VM1.
To make this happen we first assign an IP address in the same range to one of the
free interfaces on XenServer. We use eth2 and set it up to work with the IP address
192.168.1.1. VM1 interface needs to be added to the same bridge that eth2 is on. We
add the VM1 interface to xenbr2. The last step is to inform xenbr0 where to find its
controller. We set up that using the following command:
ovs-vsctl set-controller <bridge> tcp:<ip>:<port>
To do all the configuration of VMs we use software provided by Citrix, called
XenCenter [10]. This software connects to the XenServer remotely and gives full
control over the physical machine and VMs. There is also a command line interface
(CLI) that allows control of VMs and their attributes. But XenCenter makes it very
convenient to control everything through the GUI it provides.
This software provides us a console to each VM. Through this console we can
access each VM and configure the required attributes. In the validation phase of
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this project we use the same console to reach each one of the VMs and perform the
verification. Using XenCenter on a VM, higher level configuration such as adding a
virtual network interface to a VM or assigning that interface to XenCenter’s bridges
as one of their ports, is also supported.
To complete the testbed setup, we need to create another OpenFlow disabled
network including all the VMs. As shown in Figure 3.3 this network is for probing
purposes. We will see that in the load-based policy, we use this network to probe all
of the Rsyslog servers. By probing Rsyslog servers at the time of server selection in
the load-balancing process, we can prevent the controller from forwarding data to a
server that is down. In order to add this network, we have to add a second interface
to each one of the Rsyslog servers and a third network interface to the controller.
Recall that second interface on the controller is dedicated to a TCP channel between
the controller and the OVS. After adding another interface to all of the VMs we have
to put them all on the same OVS bridge. We assign all of them to xenbr3 on OVS.
Each VM has been assigned an IP address in range of 192.168.2.0/24.
3.2 Controller Design
In this section we explain different components in the controller and how they
work together. As we know, the controller is in charge of making all the forwarding
decisions in our data network. Our goal is to divide the load among the Rsyslog
servers in such a way that one Rsyslog server receives the load at a time. We develop
three policies in which the objective is to spread the load in such a way to make these
files as even in size as possible.
1. Round-Robin: In this policy we assign each server a static ID starting from
zero, and incrementing by one. For the first time around, we choose ID number
zero, and store the ID number of the selected server in a static variable. Every
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Figure 3.3: OpenFlow Disabled Network Setup for Network Probing.
time this method is called, we retrieve the ID number of last selected server,
increment it by one and perform a modulo n operation on it, where n is the
total number of Rsyslog servers.
2. Random: In this policy we choose our next server at random.
3. Load-Based: In this policy we choose the server which has received the least
amount of data for today.
Since the first two policies are the most common policies in load balancing, we
have chosen to implement them as well. The reason for implementing the Load-Based
policy is that we believe the first two policies cannot operate well in a network where
server failures occur.
Before describing different components in the controller, we explain how Open-
Daylight works and how we should develop a controller using OpenDaylight. Open-
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Daylight takes advantage of the following tools and software:
• Bundle: A bundle consists of a group [5] of Java classes that form an application
and come with a manifest file containing information about these classes, as well
as required packages and services that are needed by these groups of Java classes.
• OSGi: The Open Gateway Service initiative [4] is a set of specifications that
enables system modularity. It installs bundles and allows them to exchange
their information using a service model without revealing their content. It also
allows to remotely install, update, uninstall, stop or start, a bundle.
• Maven: Maven is a project management tool [25]. It uses a project object
model (POM) xml file to detect dependencies for the project, needed pack-
ages to download, where to look for those packages and what bundles to start.
OpenDaylight uses this software to automate the process of building a project.
In OpenDaylight, our controller is nothing but a bundle that uses other bundles’
services to provide a load-balancing application for a specific use. Next we explain in
detail the different components in our bundle.
3.2.1 Initialization
Prior to initializing our bundle, we need to uninstall three of the bundles that are
running by default in order to prevent any interference with our bundle. These three
bundles are:
• ARP Handler: As its name suggests this bundle is responsible for handling all
of the ARP packets.
• Simple Forwarding: Simple Forwarding is an application that makes simple
forwarding decisions like a conventional switch, and installs rules related to the
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forwarding decisions across the entire OpenFlow network. It has the ability to
discover hosts using ARP messages.
• Load Balancer Service: This built-in load balancer application installs Open-
Flow rules reactively. It can be configured through the REST API to forward
all packets with a specific source and port address to one its backend servers.
Random and Round-Robin are two policies that this bundle includes.
We stop these three bundles because they interfere with the logic of our bundle.
When the ARP Handler is running it responds to ARP requests and it does not allow
our bundle to receive those packets. Therefore, if we do not stop the ARP Handler
our bundle cannot create a mapping between MAC addresses and IP addresses using
ARP messages. Although not stopping the ARP Handler does not mean that our
bundle would not work properly, it is better to stop this bundle so we can handle
ARP messages through our bundle and use them to create a mapping between IP
and MAC addresses faster.
The Simple Forwarding bundle also does not match with the logic of our bundle.
It simply finds routes to hosts and writes rules for those flows. But our requirement
is to change the packet destination for load balancing purposes periodically. As a
result this bundle interferes with our application and is therefore stopped.
The last bundle we stop before starting our bundle is the default load balancing
bundle. By running some experiments we determined that this load balancer cannot
divide the UDP load among our Rsyslog servers. Although this bundle needs to
be configured through the REST API to start working, we prefer to prevent any
unpredictable behavior this bundle may cause by stopping it.
The PA firewall directs everything to one IP address. In our testbed, that IP
address is an alias IP address, meaning that there is no Rsyslog server running with
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that IP address. Now it is our job to redirect everything that the PA sends out, to
real Rsyslog servers. The IP addresses of the Rsyslog servers and the IP address of
an alias Rsyslog server are given to our bundle via a file on the controller. We have to
know these IP addresses for further processing and packet manipulation. In this file a
32-bit integer value is provided as well. This value is the hard time-out for OpenFlow
rules our bundle writes on the OpenFlow switch. The configuration file format is:
Policy = Policy name
Hard timeout = m seconds
The repeating the same selection limit = t times
Alias IP = IP address of alias Rsyslog
Server IP = first Rsyslog server IP address
Server IP = second Rsyslog server IP address
.
.
.
Server IP = nth Rsyslog server IP address
We will explain the repeating the same selection limit in the first step of the
Handling UDP Packets, subsection 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Processing Incoming Packets
When a packet comes into the OpenFlow enabled switch, the switch tries to find
a match for the packet in its forwarding table. If the switch fails to find a match
for the packet, it forwards the packet to the controller. OpenDaylight receives the
packet and it notifies all the bundles that have implemented its IListenDataPacket
24
interface. To process an incoming packet in a bundle, the bundle has to override the
receiveDataPacket method in the IListenDataPacket interface. This method returns
a type known as PacketResult. PacketResult can acquire three different values.
1. PacketResult.CONSUME
2. PacketResult.IGNORED
3. PacketResult.KEEP PROCESSING
The CONSUME value notifies OpenDaylight that our bundle has taken care of
this packet and no other bundle in the chain after us should get a copy of this
packet. The IGNORED value informs OpenDaylight our bundle has not processed
this packet. Hence, a copy of this packet has to be forwarded to other bundles for
further processing. The KEEP PROCESSING value indicates that the packet has
been processed by our bundle and further processing is still possible by other bundles.
As a result the controller forwards a copy of the packet to other bundles.
Now that we know how to get a copy of incoming packets from OpenDaylight,
we must describe how to process them. When our bundle starts working, it does not
know anything about the network’s topology or the servers’ MAC addresses. So when
we get a new packet we extract this information into two different hash tables. We
are interested in knowing what IP address corresponds to what MAC address, and
what MAC address corresponds to which port on the switch. Without knowing this
information we cannot write proper OpenFlow rules on the switch. Hence we need
to collect this information before we can start writing any rules.
Since the PA encapsulates its data in UDP packets, after extracting the IP and
MAC information we check to see whether the packet is a UDP packet. If it is a TCP
packet we ignore it and leave it to other bundles to process. If it is anything other
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than UDP we inform the switch to flood these packets, depending on what mode the
bundle is operating, but we do not write any rule for them. Our bundle operates
in two different modes. The first mode is an initialization mode, and the second
mode is a post-initialization mode. Initialization mode indicates that the bundle has
not collected all the information required for writing OpenFlow rules. As a result
it keeps broadcasting all packets except TCP and UDP packets. When the bundle
collects needed information, it transitions to its post-initialization mode. This means
the controller stops broadcasting any packets except ARP messages. Next we go into
detail of handling UDP packets.
3.2.3 Handling UDP Packets
When we process UDP packets we are only interested in packets destined for our
alias Rsyslog IP address. Therefore, we do not further process a UDP packet if it is
not intended to go to an Rsyslog server. To route a UDP packet with syslog content
we perform the following steps:
1. Use the load balancing policy to select a server.
2. Create a match for packets similar to the current packet.
3. Make a list of actions to be made on any match with this packet.
4. Write the rule for this flow in the switch.
5. Forward the current packet.
6. Periodically, proactively update this flow to forward packets to the next server
according to the load balancing policy.
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Selecting a Server
We select a server from the server pool based on the policy we are using to spread
the load. We assign an integer to each server starting from zero and incrementing by
one. We call this number our server ID. We put these values in a hash table. This
makes selecting a server from an existing server pool and tracking previous choices
easier. Then based on the policy we are using, we select a server as the destination
of packets.
To make sure we are not sending the packets to a server that is down or to a
server that is having trouble listening on port number 514 (this is the default port to
receive syslog messages), using a script we first probe port 514 on all of the servers
to determine which of them is up and listening. All the syslog servers listen on port
514 for TCP and UDP packets. Since there is no way to verify delivery of a probing
packet using UDP, we use TCP to probe port 514 on the servers. There are two
different methods to probe a TCP port. One is to connect to that TCP port, i.e.,
open a connection and tear it down immediately. The other is to only send the SYN
packet to the TCP port and wait for a SYN-ACK packet. If the server sends the SYN-
ACK packet it means it is up and listening on that port. We use the second method,
since it is slightly faster and does not require the Rsyslog daemon on the server to
create another process to listen on the same port. To implement second method we
use Nmap [17], software that allows us to scan ports on a computer network, and
provides us a result indicating whether specific port is open on each host. At first
we wanted to use this software to probe the network, but for unknown reasons the
probing process was very time consuming. For instance instead of probing a server in
a fraction of a second, it took about twenty seconds for Nmap to produce a report.
As a result we decided to use the setup connection method instead.
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The code to probe the servers is written in Python. This code is called at the
beginning of the server selection process. It writes the probing results in a file. Later
in our program, the bundle reads the results from the file and uses them to check
which servers are available in the server pool.
Different load balancing policies use this information about available servers dif-
ferently. The Round-Robin policy first selects the next server simply by incrementing
the server ID from the last time. Then it checks to see if that server is up and running.
If it is not up, increments the server ID and checks again. This process continues until
the selected server’s status is up.
The Random policy first uses the information in the file to create an array of
server IDs whose status is up, then it selects a number in range of the array’s length
at random; this number is the index of selected server ID in the array.
The Load-Based policy chooses a server based on the number of bytes the switch
has sent out on each port. An OpenFlow switch has the ability to keep track of
statistics such as the number of packets it has received and sent out on each port,
the number of errors in receiving and transmitting packets, the number of incoming
and outgoing dropped packets, etc. Since OpenDaylight is a RESTful controller, to
obtain such statistics we query the controller by sending a specific web URL to the
controller on port 8080. The OpenDaylight controller has a web server running on
that port by default. When we send out the query to the controller to obtain the
statistics, the controller processes it and sends the corresponding command to the
switch to get the information. The statistics that come back from the switch are in
JSON format. Our bundle parses the JSON report to obtain the number of bytes
that is sent out on each port. Since the switch keeps this information for each port,
we have to use a hash map to figure out what servers are on what ports.
Rsyslog can separate incoming logs based on the server’s local time. For instance
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it can put all the logs in a file on an hourly or a daily basis. In our case Rsyslog splits
the logs on a day to day basis. Our objective is to make the files for each day as equal
in size as possible. Therefore we need to derive number of bytes we have sent out for
the day from the total number of bytes that we have sent out from the beginning of
controller’s job. As a result we need to keep track of how many bytes we have sent
out on each port starting from midnight of each day. Recall only those ports that go
to a server are important to us. By subtracting the number of bytes we sent out at
midnight from the number of bytes we have sent out up to this moment, we obtain
the number of bytes we have sent out to the current time. Using our hash map we
can detect which server corresponds to the fewest number of bytes that we have sent
out on all ports. In this calculation there is one thing we need to be cautious about,
and that is overflow. As the OpenFlow specification declares, the number of received
bytes is stored in a 64-bit unsigned integer. Hence if we get a negative number in our
calculation, an overflow has occurred. To take care of this overflow, we need to add
up the following values to get the number of received bytes so far for the day for that
particular server:
• The difference of the maximum positive value an unsigned 64-bit integer can
store and the number of received bytes at midnight
• The number of received bytes so far for the day
As we will see, the different policies behave differently when a server that has
been down for a while comes back up. The Round-Robin and Random policies do
not try to compensate for the time the server was unreachable. They continue their
normal routine. They only use the server that just came back up to split the load.
On the other hand, the Load-Based policy keeps selecting the server that just came
back up to compensate for the time it was down. There is an option in this policy
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that can be set to put a limit for selecting same server repeatedly. This option could
be set in the configuration file in integer format. We call this number the repeating
the same selection limit (RSSL). The RSSL determines how many times a server can
be selected consecutively. This option not only can prevent other servers from being
idle, but also can help to keep the server that was down from being overwhelmed
with data. The smaller the RSSL, the longer the compensation time lasts, where
compensation time is the time it takes for controller to fill the created gap between
the server that was down and the rest of the servers.
Creating a Match
In the second step we have to create a matching rule. We match a packet based on
following fields:
• EtherType
• Network Protocol
• Network Destination Address
• Destination Port Address
EtherType is a two-byte field that shows which protocol is encapsulated inside an
Ethernet frame. For those packets going to the Rsyslog server this value is 0x0800
which indicates that the Ethernet frame contains an IPv4 payload.
The Network Protocol is a one byte field indicating the protocol encapsulated in
the IPv4 frame. If this field is equal to 17, the IPv4 packet encapsulates a UDP
packet.
The Network Destination Address is the destination IP address which is repre-
sented in integer type. The packets that we are interested in forwarding have a
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destination IP address set to the alias Rsyslog server.
The Destination Port Address is represented in a short type, indicating the desti-
nation port where packets are destined. By default, Rsyslog listens on port 514.
Since our purpose is to forward all the traffic to one server at a time and there
are multiple PA firewalls in principle, we cannot include the source IP address in the
fields to match. For the same reason we cannot include the source port address.
Making a List of Actions
We now make a list of actions to be taken on the packets that have the same fields
as our match. These actions are:
• Rewrite the destination MAC address of the packet with the destination MAC
address of the selected server.
• Rewrite the destination IP address of the packet with the destination IP address
of the selected server.
• Forward this packet on the outgoing port that reaches the selected server.
Writing the Rule
In the fourth step we write a flow on the switch. This flow includes a match and a set
of actions to be taken on that match. To write a flow on the switch we need to specify
a hard and soft timeout for that flow. A hard timeout defines the expiration time of
the flow after the flow is installed. A soft timeout specifies to remove the flow after a
flow is idle for the given period of time. The hard timeout could be set by the user in
a configuration file placed on the controller. We do not set the idle timeout, since the
PA never stops flooding. As a result before this flow becomes idle we need to rewrite
another flow to forward the load to another server in order to prevent losing packets.
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Forwarding the Current Packet
In this step we have to forward the current packet to the selected server. Otherwise
we lose those packets that do not match the rule on the switch and are forwarded to
the controller for further processing. To do so we have to rewrite some parts of the IP
packet and UDP packet. The checksum in UDP packet needs to be updated to reflect
the IP address of the selected server. The UDP checksum is a one’s complement sum
over the IP header, UDP header and data [23]. For the new packet, the UDP header
and the data remain the same. But the IP header changes. Hence we have to update
the UDP checksum reflect the change. To update the checksum we use the following
rule:
New checksum = Old checksum - ( IP address of the alias Rsyslog server - IP
address of selected server)
We also have to rewrite the IP address and MAC address parts in the IP packet.
Then the packet is ready to be sent out on the proper outgoing port.
Updating the Current Flow
The last step is to update the current flow periodically. Since the speed of the data
coming in is fast, on the order of hundreds of megabits per second, we need to write
the flow proactively. If we write the rule reactively we might lose some of the packets
due to the high incoming data rate. The period of updating the flow is relative to
the hard timeout for the flow. We update the flow α seconds prior to its expiration
time. α is defined as the time it takes for the controller to do all required actions for
updating the flow table and rewrite the existing rule. By doing this we would not
allow the switch to remain without a proper rule for any incoming flow of interest.
In the next chapter we design two experiments to test our controller and compare
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results that we obtain from different policies, and to the existing commercial load-
balancer.
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Chapter 4
EVALUATION OF SDN LOAD-BALANCING POLICIES
In this chapter we design two experiments, one is to verify that our solution is reliable
and can deliver the data that the current solution delivers. The other verifies that our
solution splits the load among the servers as the current solution. We also compare
the three SDN load-balancing policies to see which one performs better in terms of
balancing the load.
4.1 Design of the Experiment
The Palo Alto (PA) sends its log data to ASU’s Rsyslog servers as well as to our
testbed. Therefore the data we are receiving is a replica of what is being sent to
ASU’s Rsyslog servers. However, the path to our testbed is different from path going
to ASU’s servers and the data is being sent in UDP. As a result there is no guarantee
that we get exactly the same data as ASU’s Rsyslog servers. As we will see, this is
why sometimes we deliver more data than the current solution.
We set-up and run two experiments. In the first experiment we run each policy
for at least five days and we gather the results. During this period none of our servers
experienced any failures. In the second experiment we simulate the condition of losing
one or even two of the servers for some time, by taking the servers down, to see how
each policy handles server loss. We explore how well each policy operated in terms
of data delivery and splitting the data as equally as possible among Rsyslog servers.
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4.2 Data Delivery Verification
The best method to check the data delivery is to feed the log files collected by our
Rsyslog servers on the testbed to Splunk and see if we are getting the same results
as the direct feed to ASU’s Rsyslog servers. Since Splunk licensing is based on the
amount of data we feed Splunk each day, and the fact these log files are huge (on the
order of tens of giga bytes), UTO decided not to use this verification method.
Another way to verify the data delivery is to compare log files that we gather with
the log files that UTO stores in ASU’s data centers before feeding them to Splunk.
Since these log files are huge and we cannot enter the data centers because of security
reasons, this verification method is not feasible either.
One other way that we can compare our results to what UTO obtains is to compare
the number of syslog messages that we recieve to the number of syslog messages that
Splunk indexes in its database. As it is described in syslog standard [15], each syslog
message has to be sent in one line. As a result, each line in the log files that we store
on our servers is a syslog message. We can count the number of lines in each file and
obtain the number of syslog messages in a file using a Linux command. However, we
have to consider Splunk filtering. As these logs are generated in ASU’s production
network, UTO filters the logs for management purposes. Hence, we need to perform
the same filtering as UTO before comparing our numbers. UTO filters some of the
logs based on IP addresses. We use a Linux command to count the number of lines
in the log files except those lines that contain certain IP addresses. After that we
add up the numbers that we get from each log file and compare the sum with the
number that Splunk gives us. The delivery ratio is defined by dividing the sum by
the Splunk’s number. We present results for each policy.
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4.2.1 Round-Robin Policy
In the first experiment, there is no server failure. As can be seen in Figure 4.1 and
Table 4.1 the number of syslog messages that we obtain after filtering is very close to
what Splunk indexes into its database.
Figure 4.1: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Round-Robin
Policy With No Server Failures.
In the second experiment we simulate server failure by shutting servers down. As
Figure 4.2 shows, on December 19th we experienced an unusual gap between what
we stored on our servers and what the Splunk report shows. Numerical results for
this experiment are in Table 4.2. But the average delivery ratio (number of syslog
messages we stored on testbed divided by number of syslog messages Splunk indexed
for each day) over this period was still 0.993.
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Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Nov 24th 192664117 193157905 493788 0.997443604
Nov 25th 193478076 194470616 992540 0.994896196
Nov 26th 173037862 173405381 367519 0.997880579
Nov 27th 145913198 146199972 286774 0.998038481
Nov 28th 154588059 155168922 580863 0.996256576
Table 4.1: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Round-Robin Policy With No
Server Failures.
Figure 4.2: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Round-Robin
Policy With Server Failures.
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Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Dec 18th 61450166 61974048 523882 0.991546752
Dec 19th 46629441 54922906 8293465 0.848998066
Dec 20th 35155013 35214334 59321 0.99831543
Dec 21th 40500742 35132478 -5368264 1.152800608
Dec 22th 50886551 52465403 1578852 0.969906797
Table 4.2: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Round-Robin Policy With Server
Failures.
Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Dec 1st 216021445 216497873 476428 0.997799387
Dec 2nd 220307032 221506328 1199296 0.994585726
Dec 3rd 213855086 214371744 516658 0.997589897
Dec 4th 217260686 218149382 888696 0.995926204
Dec 5th 189661407 189555048 -106359 1.000561098
Table 4.3: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Random Policy With No Server
Failures.
4.2.2 Random Policy
As Figure 4.3 depicts, the Random policy performance was very good in terms of
data delivery for the first experiment with the average delivery ratio of 0.997. These
results can be found in Table 4.3 as well.
As Figure 4.4 and Table 4.4 show, the Random policy performed very well, in
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Figure 4.3: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Random Policy
With No Server Failures.
terms of data delivery, in the second experiment as well.
4.2.3 Load-Based Policy
As well as the other policies, the Load-Based demonstrated a very good delivery
ratio, with an average ratio of 1.03 and 1.00, as can be seen in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6
for the first and the second experiments, respectively. Numerical results can be found
in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, respectively. During the first experiment 0.96 and 1.10
are the lowest and the highest data delivery ratios, respectively. While during the
second experiment these ratios are 0.96 and 1.04, respectively.
4.3 Load-Balancing Results
In this section we compare the different policies in terms of spreading the load
among servers based on the results that we gathered from running them on the
controller. We compare these policies for each experiment separately. To measure
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Figure 4.4: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Random Policy
With Server Failures.
Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Jan 5th 73188622 68323257 -4865365 1.071210964
Jan 6th 74993873 70059638 -4934235 1.070429068
Jan 7th 70052433 75863551 5811118 0.923400396
Jan 8th 77290725 69014981 -8275744 1.119912284
Jan 9th 110467859 106417245 -4050614 1.038063511
Table 4.4: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Random Policy With Server
Failures.
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Figure 4.5: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Load-Based
Policy With No Server Failures.
Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Dec 25th 37444009 37101507 -342502 1.009231485
Dec 26th 41644757 37871078 -3773679 1.099645408
Dec 27th 39752694 41029295 1276601 0.968885622
Dec 28th 56260329 51003489 -5256840 1.103068243
Dec 29th 56928490 58358202 1429712 0.975501096
Table 4.5: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Load-Based Policy With No
Server Failures.
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Figure 4.6: The Number of Syslog Messages After Filtering on the Testbed Compared
to the Number of Messages Splunk Indexed Into Its Database for the Load-Based
Policy With Server Failures.
Date Testbed (T ) Splunk (S) Difference (S − T ) Delivery ratio (S/T )
Dec 31th 48887055 50388054 1500999 0.970211213
Jan 1st 46580918 45021297 -1559621 1.03464185
Jan 2nd 51567124 53219385 1652261 0.968953775
Jan 3rd 47356854 45434582 -1922272 1.042308566
Jan 4th 47786448 47741711 -44737 1.000937063
Table 4.6: Total Number of Syslog Messages on the Testbed After Filtering Compared
to the Number of Messages in Splunk Report for the Load-Based Policy With Server
Failures.
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the performance of each policy in terms of spreading the load, we define the split ratio
by dividing the smallest file size by the largest one stored on the testbed for each day.
4.3.1 First Scenario: Without Server Failure
In the first experiment all the servers are up and running for the whole experiment.
This is the ideal network status that does not happen very often. We run all of the
policies with the same configuration that might affect the result such as hard timeout
for flows that we write on the switch. In this case the hard timeout for all policies is
eight seconds. This means that after eight seconds the controller must select another
server to forward the load.
The first policy we run on the testbed is Round-Robin. As Figure 4.7 and Table 4.7
show, Round-Robin divides the load among servers almost equally. The largest split
ratio during this experiment is 0.99, while the smallest ratio is 0.98.
Figure 4.7: Round-Robin Policy Divides the Syslog Load Among Rsyslog Servers
With No Server Failures.
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Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Nov 24th 25.38 GB 25.13 GB 25.15 GB 0.989912803
Nov 25th 25.26 GB 25.06 GB 25.03 GB 0.990710266
Nov 26th 22.63 GB 22.45 GB 22.51 GB 0.991811974
Nov 27th 19.42 GB 19.26 GB 19.32 GB 0.991758144
Nov 28th 20.85 GB 20.62 GB 20.68 GB 0.988974086
Table 4.7: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day When the
Controller Was Running Round-Robin Policy With No Server Failures.
Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Dec 1st 28.19 GB 28.19 GB 28.04 GB 0.99454847
Dec 2nd 28.91 GB 29.24 GB 28.73 GB 0.982632883
Dec 3rd 28.54 GB 27.51 GB 27.96 GB 0.964127122
Dec 4th 29.24 GB 27.73 GB 27.84 GB 0.948370566
Dec 5th 24.78 GB 24.98 GB 23.94 GB 0.958304583
Table 4.8: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day When the
Controller Was Running Random Policy With No Server Failures.
Then, we run Random policy on the controller. The result is given in Figure 4.8.
The Random policy also spreads the load in such a way that can be used in a network
without any server failures. Table 4.8 shows file sizes at the end of each day on each
server while the controller was running the Random policy. During this experiment
the largest split ratio is 0.99, whereas the smallest ratio is 0.94.
Finally, we run the Load-Based policy on the testbed. As Figure 4.9 shows, the
Load-Based policy behaved very similar to the Round-Robin policy. This policy
spreads the load among the servers almost equally. Performance of all of the policies
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Figure 4.8: Random Policy Divides the Syslog Load Among Rsyslog Servers With No
Server Failures.
was very good in terms of balancing the load between servers. Actual file sizes for
this run can be found in Table 4.9. The largest and the smallest split ratios in this
experiment are 0.98 and 0.97, respectively.
During the course of the first experiment the best average split ratio belongs to
the Round-Robin policy by the rate of 0.99. While the Random policy has the worst
average split ratio by the rate of 0.96.
4.3.2 Second Experiment: With Server Failure
In the second experiment we simulate the condition of losing one or two servers
by turning off Rsyslog servers. Using XenCenter we reach the Rsyslog server that we
want to turn off and shut it down. We examine the performance of all the policies in
this condition, and then we compare their results.
First we run the Round-Robin policy. In Figure 4.10 we can see syslog file sizes
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Figure 4.9: Load-Based Policy Divides the Syslog Load Among Rsyslog Servers With
No Server Failures.
Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Dec 25th 33.70 GB 33.07 GB 33.03 GB 0.980028907
Dec 26th 24.76 GB 24.39 GB 24.38 GB 0.984667995
Dec 27th 31.49 GB 30.95 GB 30.97 GB 0.98291316
Dec 28th 39.81 GB 39.03 GB 39.18 GB 0.980243263
Dec 29th 38.22 GB 37.48 GB 37.34 GB 0.976772638
Table 4.9: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day When the
Controller Was Running Load-Based Policy With No Server Failures.
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immediately before losing a server and at the time the server comes back up. Fig-
ure 4.11 shows the final syslog file sizes on each Rsyslog server at the end of each
day; the actual file sizes are in Table 4.10. On average we lost one server for about
two hours per day. In comparing Figure 4.11 with Figure 4.10b we see that this pol-
icy retains the gap created due to server failure between the server that experienced
failure and the other servers. As a result the Round-Robin policy does not work well
when servers fail. During this experiments the Round-Robin policy has the smallest
and the largest split ratio of 0.75 and 0.90, respectively.
(a) Immediately before losing a server (b) Immediately after all servers come back up
Figure 4.10: Log File Sizes Immediately Before Losing a Server and Immediately
After Server Recovery.
Now, we explore performance of the Random policy. As Figure 4.12 depicts, after
the server recovers, the gap in the file sizes is retained. But as we have seen in
Round-Robin policy, the Random policy is not able to fill this gap after recovery.
The Random policy obtains the smallest and the largest split ratio of 0.80 and 0.97,
respectively.
As Figure 4.13 shows, at the end of each day we can see that the gap remains.
Hence the Random policy is not suitable when servers fail. Table 4.11 shows the final
syslog file sizes for this period.
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Figure 4.11: Syslog File Sizes on the Testbed at the End of Each Day for the Round-
Robin Policy With Server Failures.
Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Dec 18th 30.23 GB 26.68 GB 30.02 GB 0.882603893
Dec 19th 21.82 GB 25.98 GB 25.94 GB 0.840052407
Dec 20th 25.57 GB 19.54 GB 25.04 GB 0.764244724
Dec 21th 32.50 GB 35.95 GB 35.71 GB 0.90421896
Dec 22th 34.47 GB 26.12 GB 33.87 GB 0.757887583
Table 4.10: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day While the
Controller Was Running Round-Robin Policy With Server Failures.
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(a) Immediately before losing a server (b) Immediately after all servers come back up
Figure 4.12: Log File Sizes Immediately Before Losing a Server and Immediately
After Server Recovery.
Figure 4.13: Syslog File Sizes on the Testbed at the End of Each Day for the Random
Policy With Server Failures.
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Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Jan 5th 39.07 GB 45.23 GB 45.18 GB 0.863902131
Jan 6th 43.16 GB 34.70 GB 41.95 GB 0.80407031
Jan 7th 25.40 GB 28.57 GB 28.59 GB 0.888571795
Jan 8th 34.98 GB 37.37 GB 32.44 GB 0.868200106
Jan 9th 36.96 GB 35.89 GB 36.03 GB 0.970871603
Table 4.11: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day While the
Controller Was Running Random Policy With Server Failures.
Finally, we run Load-Based policy on the controller. In Figure 4.14 we can see
syslog file sizes before the server fault and after server recovery.
(a) Immediately before losing a server (b) Immediately after all servers come back up
Figure 4.14: Log File Sizes Immediately Before Losing a Server and Immediately
After Server Recovery.
As can be seen in Figure 4.15 and Table 4.12 this policy is able to compensate
for the time that some of the servers were down (unless, the server was to fail at
the end of the day and there is insufficient time for recovery). This policy tries to
connect the imbalance in file sizes due to a fault network or server. The behavior
of this policy is very similar to the Round-Robin and Load-Based policy in the first
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experiment where we had all the servers up for the whole experiment. During this
experiment the Load-Based policy performs the best among all of the policies with
the largest and the smallest split ratios of 0.97 and 0.98, respectively. As a result, we
can conclude that the Load-Based policy is the most appropriate for a network where
servers may fail.
During the second experiment, the Round-Robin policy obtains the worst average
split ratio with the ratio of 0.82. Whereas the best performance in terms of load-
balancing belongs to the Load-Based policy with the split ratio of 0.97.
Figure 4.15: Syslog File Sizes on the Testbed at the End of Each Day for the Load-
Based Policy With Server Failures.
4.4 Overall Summary
Our evaluations on different SDN-based transport-level load balancing policies
suggest that we can divide the load almost equally among Rsyslog servers using any
policy when server failures are unlikely to happen. We also demonstrated that using a
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Date Server 1 file size Server 2 file size Server 3 file size Split ratio (Min/Max)
Dec 31st 29.00 GB 28.48 GB 28.60 GB 0.982225926
Jan 1st 35.55 GB 34.92 GB 34.52 GB 0.970855028
Jan 2nd 28.47 GB 28.02 GB 27.96 GB 0.982183892
Jan 3rd 22.04 GB 21.64 GB 21.67 GB 0.981745024
Jan 4th 31.07 GB 30.48 GB 30.48 GB 0.98101208
Table 4.12: Final Syslog File Sizes on Each Server at the End of Each Day While the
Controller Was Running Load-Based Policy With Server Failures.
Load-Based policy is most appropriate to divide the load almost equally when servers
may fail. With overall average delivery ratio of 1.01 and the split ratio of 0.92, our
results suggest that SDN-based load balancing could replace the existing solution.
In the next chapter, we summarize our contributions and propose future work.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we discussed the need for an SDN transport-level load balancing solution
over UDP packets. We discussed three different load balancing policies and how we
can take advantage of SDN specifications and use network statistics that it offers to
perform a network-aware load balancing over UDP packets. We implemented three
different policies and we tested them in two experiments in our testbed with a data
feed from ASU’s production network.
We defined delivery ratio as a metric to validate whether our solution is reliable.
This ratio is calculated by dividing the number of the syslog messages received on
the testbed in a day to the number of the syslog messages indexed by Splunk for the
same day. The average delivery ratio for the Round-Robin, Random, and Load-Based
policies during the first experiment, without having server failures, is 0.99, 0.99 and
1.03, respectively. Since the path to our testbed is different from path going to ASU’s
servers, and because the data is being sent in UDP, there is no guarantee that we get
exactly the same data as ASU’s Rsyslog servers. As a result the delivery ratio can be
more than one. During the second experiment, with simulation of server failure, the
average delivery ratio for the Round-Robin, Random, and Load-Based is 0.99, 1.04
and 1.00 respectively. The results of these experiments suggest that these SDN load
balancing policies are reliable enough to be used in a real production network with a
high input data rate. The results show our solution is competitive with the existing
commercial load-balancing solution for UDP traffic.
A split ratio is a metric defined to measure the ability of each policy to divide the
load equally among the servers. Dividing the smallest sized file on the testbed for a
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given day by the largest sized file on the testbed for the same day, gives us the split
ratio of that specific day. In the first experiment average split ratios for the Round-
Robin, Random, and Load-Based policies were 0.99, 0.96 and 0.98 respectively. The
split ratio for different policies during the first experiment is 0.99, 0.96 and 0.98 for the
Round-Robin, Random, and Load-Based policies, respectively, and Round-Robin had
the best ratio among them all. But for the second experiment the results were quite
different. The average split ratio over the period of the second experiment is 0.82,
0.87 and 0.97 for the Round-Robin, Random, and Load-Based policies, respectively.
The Round-Robin and Random policies could not divide the load during the second
experiment as equally as they did in the first experiment. However, the Load-Based
policy’s performance during the second experiment showed it could recover from server
failures.
In summary, the results on split ratios indicate that while each load balancing
strategy is effective when there are no server failures, when servers fail, only the
Load-Based policy can recover and keep the split ratio high. Therefore, if equal file
size is an outcome of load balancing, the Load-Based policy is most appropriate.
In this project we used an OpenFlow enabled software switch to balance the load.
Future work could use an OpenFlow enabled hardware switch to perform the load
balancing. This should only improve our results because switching rates are faster on
physical hardware and would even allow us to handle input at a faster data rate.
In this thesis we restricted our attention to balance the load over the UDP pro-
tocol. The Palo Alto firewall also can run over TCP. By using TCP instead of UDP,
future work can eliminate loss of packets. However, this change complicates the
controller design since connection setup and state management would need to be
maintained across the servers.
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